Abstract-In this paper, we examine the spectrum of a digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) linear rate gate stealer (RGS) electronic attack (EA) signal. The spectrum has two noticeable characteristics. The first is a small, yet measurable, center frequency shift from the input center frequency. The second is the presence of harmonics (spectral lines) of significant magnitude centered on either side of the shifted center frequency. The primary source of these spectral characteristics is the discrete nature of the DRFM. W e develop expressions to predicted the center frequency shift and the locations of the harmonics as function of the radar and DRFM parameters. These spectral characteristics should be of interest to radar and EA engineers since they could potentially effect system performance. Signal intelligence analysts should also find these spectral characteristics of interest since they provide additional clues for assessing EA systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a pulse radar system, the target range is tracked automatically using a split range gate system consisting of an early range gate and a late range gate [l, 176-1771. The early and late range gates are contiguous in time (range) and are approximately one pulsewidth wide. The combination of the early and late range gates is referred to as the range tracking gate. The range tracking point is the center of the range tracking gate (i.e., the joint between the early and late range gates). Initially, the position of the range tracking gate is set using range information obtained during search operations. After placing the range tracking gate over the target, a control loop is used to continuously adjusted the range tracking point to center the range tracking gate on the target. The error signal used in the control loop is based on the difference between the energy in the early and late range gates. The control loop is designed to balance the energy level between the early and late range gates. That is, as the target moves in range, the energy levels in the early and late range gates are not equal and the resulting error signal is used to reposition the range tracking gate in an attempt to balance the energy between the gates. 
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The target's range and velocity, as well as the azimuth and elevation angles to the target, play a critical role in successfully engaging the target. Typically, an electronic attack (EA) system or jammer is employed on the target to deny the radar target information (range, velocity, azimuth and elevation angles) or to inject false target information into the radar. The range gate stealer (RGS) technique is one of the most fundamental EA techniques used to deny accurate range information to the radar. With the RGS technique, the EA system transmits a pulse of radio frequency (RF) energy that initially arrives at the radar time coincident with the target pulse. That is, both the jamming and target pulses are initially present in the range tracking gate. After a short period of time coincidence, the EA system begins to continuously delay the jamming pulse (RGS signal) with respect to the target pulse. The delayed jamming pulse attempts to draw the range tracker off the true target. If successful, the range tracker tracks the false (jamming) target until the EA system turns off the RGS signal. Without the RGS signal in the range tracking gate, the radar breaks range lock and initiates a search for the true target. The use of RGS to cause range break locks will complicate and hamper the successful engagement of the target. Several methods exist for generating RGS signals, with the most recent method using DRFM devices.
A DRFM EA system consist of five primary components: down converter, analog-to-digital converter (ADC), memory, digital-to-analog converter (DAC) , and up converter. The basic operation of the DRFM is as follows. The received radar signal is down converted and sampled by the ADC. The samples are then stored in memory. The samples are later recalled from memory, passed through the DAC, up converted, and transmitted. Once the radar signal is stored in memory, the radar signal parameters can be manipulated by changing the stored samples and recalled at anytime to produce a wide range of EA signals. For the relatively simple case of linear RGS, the DRFM EA system retransmits a copy of the radar pulse with a linearly increasing time delay with respect to the received radar pulse. Due to its digital nature, the DRFM can only delay the pulse in discrete steps (time delay resolution) at discrete time intervals (update rate). The discrete time delay resolution and update rate of the DRFM introduce two noticeable spectral characteristics.
The first is a small, yet measurable, center frequency shift from the input center frequency. The second is the presence of harmonics (spectral lines) of significant magnitude centered on either side of the shifted center frequency. In this paper, we examine these DRFM linear RGS spectral characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 11, we develop expressions to predict the size of the center frequency shift and the location of the harmonics. In Section 111, we provide simulation results to verify the expressions presented in Section 11. Finally, we give some concluding remarks in Section IV.
11. ANALYSIS Let z(t) be the signal input to the EA system, then output signal y(t) during RGS operations is given by
where c(t) is the time delay function that determines the amount of delay between the received and transmitted signals. Ideally, the time delay function of a h e a r RGS signal is a linear continuous function of time. That is, the ideal linear RGS time delay function is given by
where a is the delay (pull-off) rate. Due to its discrete nature, a DRFM based EA system must approximate the ideal time delay function with a piece-wise continuous the factory based on realistic target dynamics and radar specifications. The time delay resolution is selected such that at each update the jamming target pulse does not move outside the range tracking gate of the radar. Once the time delay resolution is set, the update rate is set to achieve the maximum jamming target range rate or pulloff rate (i.e., CY,, = t&). Thus, in general, P = t d to where r.1 denotes the next larger integer operation.
For pulse radar systems, the input signal to the DRFM is a sinusoid modulated by a pulsed waveform. We ignore the pulsed waveform in the following analysis since it simply causes a replication of the spectrum at the pulse rep etition frequency and an overall shaping of the spectrum Thus, the input signal to the DRFM can be considered to be a sinusoid and the output linear RGS is given as where 1.J denotes the next lower integer operation. We note that these phase changes occur every T, seconds.
Thus, the output signal is a sinusoid with a time varying phase, which translates into a frequency shift of the output signal relative to the input signal. The frequenvy shift of the output signal relative to the input signal is [2,
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As noted earlier, the phase changes occur every Tc and thus, we can write the output signal in the following general form:
~( t )
= C p n ( t ) b ( t -n~c ) . Figure 4 shows the spectrum for Case 3. An examination of Figure 4 reveals the absence of a frequency shift or harmonics. The absence of a frequency shift or harmonics is due to the fact that the combination of DRFM parameters and radar transmit frequency for Case 3 yields a 2x phase change per update cycle or equivalently, a zero phase change per update cycle. That is, the Case 3 DRFM linear RGS signal can be considered to have a constant phase. In general, we observe excellent agreement between the predicted and simulation results.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated that the spectrum of a DRFM linear RGS signal is not a clean copy of the radar signal as conventional wisdom (RGS techniques only attack the time domain process) might imply. The discrete nature of the DRFM for linear RGS techniques causes a small center frequency shift and harmonics within the Doppler processing band of the radar. The size of the center frequency shift and the strength and location of the harmonics is depended on the radar, DRFM and RGS parameters. These spectral harmonics should not be ignore by the radar and EA systems engineers since they could potentially effect system performance. For example, the DRFM linear RGS harmonics basically act as a narrowband noise source which could trigger the wrong (radar engineer perspective) or unintended (EA engineer perspective) response from the radar. The presence of the spectral harmonics also provides the signal intelligence analyst with additional clues for assessing threat EA systems. Finally, additional work should be done to expand the analysis and computer simulation to include parabolic RGS techniques along with an investigation to determine if the discrete nature of the DRFM impacts other EA techniques, such as velocity gate stealers. 
